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I. Introduction

"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still"
(Holmes) . Here is the great antinomy confronting us at
every turn. Rest and motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are
equally destructive. The law, like human kind, if life is to
continue, must find some path of compromise. Two distinct
tendencies, pulling in different directions, must be harnessed
together and made to work in unison. All depends on the
wisdom with which the joinder is effected. . . . Fusion in
due proportion is the problem of the ages. [Cardozo, The
Growth of the Law, 1924, pp. 2 and 3.]
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II. Duty
A. Overview of Developments in Duty
In last year's survey we noted the great extension of legal
duties exacted in a variety of relationships: Dillon v. Legg/
finding liability on the part of a driver to a parent who sustained mental disturbance, and resulting injuries, from witnessing injury to and death of her child caused by a breach
of duty to exercise care towards the child; Rowland v. Christian,a increasing the duty of the possessor of realty by predicating liability on Civil Code section 1714, which creates a
duty of ordinary care or skill in the management of property,
without reference to the old common-law classifications of
trespasser, licensee, or business invitee; Brockett v. Kitchen
Boyd Motor CO.,3 finding a duty to refrain from placing a
person in his own car, knowing of his inebriation and incapacity to drive, with resulting injuries to others; and Connor v.
The Great Western Savings and Loan Association,4 creating
a duty on the part of a savings and loan association that financed an addition to a city to see to it that the homes built
therein were not defectively constructed, and holding such
savings and loan association jointly liable with the builder for
damages resulting to purchasers of such homes.
The Connors decision is a landmark case. The fact that
the State Supreme Court split four to three is indicative of
its impact. The builders were actively negligent. The majority found that the builders and the financing association
were joint venturers, with a community of interest, a joint
interest, sharing profits and control. Both had a duty to guard
against defective plans and both were required to make due
inspections. Thus the later negligence of the builder was not
a superseding cause of injury, and privity between the home1. 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1968);
this case and the two that follow were
discussed in greater detail in Moreau,
TORTS, Cal Law-Trends and Developments 1969, pp. 374-392.
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2. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968).
3. 264 Cal. App.2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr.
136 (1968).
4. 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369,
447 P.2d 609 (1968).
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owners and the loan association was not required. Another
citadel of privity has fallen;5 as Cardozo put it, "The assault
on the citadel of privity is proceeding apace."6
The minority, headed by Justice Burke, emphasized that
there is a great difference between the duties of a supplier of
capital and the entrepreneur. The former owes its duty to its
stockholders and there is a complete lack of any agency
or joint venture between the builder and the lender on which
to base a duty to the homeowners.
The case of Rowland v. Christian7 was recognized and approved in Dixon v. St. Francis Hotel. s Plaintiff was at a hotel
for lunch, and when she walked toward the dining room she
stumbled on a plank that was laid on the floor for a painting
job. The verdict was for plaintiff, but the court granted a new
trial on the theory that the evidence did not justify the verdict. There was no trap nor inconspicuous danger. Rowland
was relied on as modifying the common-law dependence on
plaintiff's status to establish the standard of care owed. Since
plaintiff could see the situation, a warning would not be necessary; she was as well informed as the defendant as to the
hazardous condition, yet she was a business invitee.
Again, we find the Rowland case considered in Beauchamp
v. Los Gatos Golf Club. 9 Plaintiff, a woman golfer, was an invitee. She slipped on cement with her worn golf-shoe spikes
and fell. The court non-suited her and the reviewing court
reversed. The Court points out that defendant's duty was to
exercise ordinary care, as required by Civil Code section
1714, and Rowland. The status of plaintiff as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee is no longer determinative, but is still helpful. Here, as in the hotel case, there was no trap or concealed
peril and there was no liability for what was plain and observable. Breach of a duty is an indispensable factor, and
5. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,
50 Minn. L. Rev. p. 791 (1965-66).
6. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 445, 74
A.L.R. 1139, 1145 (1931).
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443 P.2d 561 (1968).
8. 271 Cal. App.2d 739, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1969).
9. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 77 Cal. Rptr.
914 (1969).
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although it was doubtful a breach had occurred, the Court, in
reversing, held defendant's breach a question of fact for jury
determination.
In Holliday v. Miles, Inc.,lO the holding of Rowland was extended to a case involving the condition of personal property
that caused damage to Holliday. Holliday was employed by
Apex, a subcontractor, in erecting a large department store.
He was using scaffolds owned by his employer but, desiring
to work in another location where scaffolds had been set up
by another subcontractor, Miles, he used the latter scaffold
and was injured when a plank, cross-grained and knotty, broke
and he fell. Holliday sued Miles, alleging his negligence in
maintaining such a defective scaffold. Holliday had received
medical and disability payments from his employer's workmen's compensation insurer who intervened in the action
against Miles, seeking to recover its payments. The trial
court nonsuited both Holliday and the insurance carrier, viewing Holliday as a mere licensee to whom no duty of ordinary
care was owed. Only the insurer appealed. In affirming,
the Court recognized that Holliday and the insurer were not
in the same position and had Holliday appealed there might
have been a reversal as to him only. Appellant's claim was
not difficult to reject since the insurer stood in the shoes of
Holliday's employer, that had a nondelegable statutory duty
to provide its employees with a safe place to work; hence, the
very defect that would create a liability on the part of Miles to
Holliday would work to bar the insurer's (employer's) right
to recover. Both Miles and Apex (Holliday's employer) had
a duty of care towards Holliday. The same defect was a
breach as to both. Miles' duty was predicated on Rowland
and Civil Code section 1714. The court rejected the trial
court's characterization of Holliday as a mere licensee, discussing the custom among contractors to allow other contractors to use scaffolds already set up. Such custom reveals a
mutual advantage or common interest under which circumstance Holliday's status would have been that of an invitee;
10. 266 Cal. App.2d 396, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 96 (1968).
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although such status is no longer determinative in establishing
the degree of care owed, it remains a consideration in the
assessment of liability.
B. Duty of the Lawyer to Clients and Third Parties

Shortly after Warren E. Burger became Chief Justice of
the United States, he addressed the convention of the American Trial Lawyer's Association. His remarks on that occasion have been published in various legal publications. The
Wisconsin State Bar Journal, October, 1969, carried the remarks under the title "A Sick Profession." It carries a bad
image. He states that medical doctors rank at the top, and
lawyers about 15th, in popularity, that the majority of lawyers
are poorly trained, and they are not performing their professional work properly. Seventy-five percent of lawyers appearing in court are deficient because of poor preparation, inability to frame questions and inability to prove a case properly. Fortunately, there are movements in the field of legal
education that aim to remedy the deficiencies.
Recent California cases involving the work of lawyers indicate that the deficiencies are not only apparent in the courtroom; the same thing is sometimes true in office work.
In Heyer v. Flaig,ll Doris, an unmarried widow, asked attorney Flaig to prepare her will. She told him that she intended to marry Glen Kilburn, but that she wanted to leave
her estate equally to her two daughters. On December 21,
1962, Doris executed her will, and ten days later she married
Glen Kilburn. Flaig failed to mention the status of the future
husband as a legatee, although he named him as executor as
Doris had requested. On July 9, 1963, Doris Kilburn died,
and her husband claimed a share of the estate as a posttestamentary spouse. Under section 70 of the Probate Code
his rights are well established. The daughters, of course, objected to his participation, as being contrary to their mother's
intention, and sought recovery of their loss from attorney
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Flaig. Suit was filed June, 1965. Defenses set up included
that the statute of limitations had rendered him immune, and
that the daughters were not in privity with him and therefore he
owed them no duty. He interposed a demurrer to the complaint and the trial court sustained it, presumably on the theory
that the action was barred under the statute, two years having
elapsed since the will had been drawn, but less than two years
had lapsed since Doris' death. The Court of Appeal affirmed
in an opinion by Justice Bishop.
Plaintiffs appealed to the State Supreme Court, relying on
Lucas v. Hamm/ 2 which gives an intended beneficiary a cause
of action for malpractice against an attorney who negligently
fails to follow the directions of his client. In rejecting the statute of limitations defense, the Court held that such cause of
action accrued when the testatrix died, since at that time the
negligent act of the attorney became irremediable and the
injury actually occurred; in fact, the wrongful act was a continuing one until the death of the testatrix. The error could
have been corrected until her death. The Court agreed that
privity is unnecessary to establish a duty on the part of attorney Flaig. The beneficiaries' right of action against counsel
arises out of public policy; a duty of care on the part of the
attorney accrues directly to the third-party beneficiaries, and
they need not sue in contract as third-party beneficiaries. The
Court explained that the interests of the beneficiaries are different from those of the testatrix. The duty owed to the beneficiaries is distinct from the duty owed the testatrix, and consequently the remedies are different. Hence, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for trial. 13
12. 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
364 P.2d 685 (1961) Cert. Den. 368
U.S. 987, 7 L.Ed.2d 525, 82 S.Ct. 603.
13. This decision clearly eliminates
further reliance on the old tragic case
of Bulkley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P.
900, 52 A.S. 88, 31 L.R.A. 862 (1895)
overruled in 49 Cal.2d 647, 651, 320
P.2d 16, 19, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358, 1363
and in 56 Cal.2d 583, 588, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821, 823, 364 P.2d 685, 687, which has
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been so difficult to defend on any theory. The lawyer used a principal beneficiary as an attesting witness, thus making it impossible for him to take under
the will. Yet he had no remedy under
the "lack of privity" doctrine, a legacy
to our law from Lord Abinger in 1842,
who said in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10
Meeson and Wellsby 109, that to allow
persons not in contractual privity to sue
would result ". . . in the most ab313
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It will be interesting to watch future developments in Heyer
v. Flaig. It is being sent back to the trial court for further
action. What will a jury do on being instructed to find whether defendant has exercised the ordinary care and skill possessed by the profession? Justice Tobriner indicates how he
feels about what was done by attorney Flaig. He states, "a
reasonably prudent attorney should appreciate the consequences of a post testamentary marriage and advise the testator of such consequences.»l4 Justice Tobriner has written a
great opinion, a monument to efficiency.
Another recent case that points out the invulnerability of
lawyers is Yandell v. Baker. 16 A firm of attorneys was consulted by businessmen who felt that they were paying too much
in taxes. They wanted to know if any changes in their business arrangement could remedy their tax situation. The attorneys agreed to do something about it in consultation with an
accounting firm. They advised radical changes in their clients'
financial structure. Six months after the changes had been
made, the government advised the clients that they were liable
for an additional assessment of $80,000. The changes had
accomplished nothing. They sued the attorneys and were
met with the defense that a one-year limitation on the action
had run. The suit had been brought shortly after the government's notification of the failure of the defendants' advice.
But the defendants had completed their work some six months
surd and outrageous consequences, to been abandoned in this state. The Lucas decision did, however, leave us with
which there would be no limit."
a monument to carelessness on the part
In Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647,
320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958), of a lawyer; he could safely violate the
the Supreme Court, without requiring
rule against perpetuities with immunity
privity, imposed liability upon a notary from liability. It seems to give carte
who had negligently failed to have a blanche to lawyers to go ahead without
will properly attested. Biakanja was worrying about what they are doing.
followed by Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Ca1.2d Some things are just too difficult. Yet
583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 the rule against perpetuities figures in
(1961) Cert. Den. 368 U.S. 987,7 L.Ed. most family trusts whether testamentary
2d 525, 82 S.Ct. 603, which, as already or inter vivos.
indicated, held that the attorney owed
14. 70 Cal.2d 223, 229, 74 Cal. Rptr.
225, 229, 449 P.2d 161, 165 (1969).
a duty of care to the beneficiaries' as
15. 258 Cal. App.2d 308, 65 Cal.
well as the testatrix. Thus the old
inflexible requirement of privity has . Rptr. 606 (1968); hearing denied.
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earlier, which was more than a year before the suit had been
brought.
The simple question was, when did the statute begin to run?
If the government had waited a little longer in advising the
clients, the cause of action for the negligence would have been
lost before they had any idea of the uselessness of what had
been done for them. This would have been clearly a wrong
without a remedy.16 In fraud cases the statute does not begin
to run until the fraud is discovered,17 and in medical malpractice cases the courts use similar thinking in preserving the
cause of action until the patient finds out about the injury
caused by the treatment. IS The Court indicated that it wished
that it could have followed the rule established in medical
cases, but thought that it had to take the law as handed down
by the State Supreme Court. The lawyers were immune. The
Supreme Court denied a hearing in this case.
Another case that emphasizes the duties of lawyers is
Ishmael v. Millington/ 9 in which attorney Millington represented both husband and wife in a divorce case. Millington
had been the husband's lawyer for some time, and it was decided that he alone should put the case through the court. It
is always dangerous for anyone to place himself in a situation
where he may be required to serve two masters. Mrs. Ishmael
signed the complaint and property settlement, relying on what
16. Chief Justice Marshall once stated that it was the boast of the law
that there was no wrong without a remedy. This was in the famous case of
Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas.
660, 665 (1811). Yet he found it impossible to give Livingston the remedy
for Jefferson's trespass on his lands in
Louisiana "which produces the inconvenience of a clear right without a remedy." It is odd indeed to refer to such
a denial as a mere inconvenience. We
are still some distance from the day
when all wrongs will be remedied.
Anyone interested in this litigation
may find it analyzed most interestingly
in Beveridge's Life of John Marshall.
CAL LAW 1970
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Marshall saw no way of holding Jefferson liable for trespass as the trespass
was made in Louisiana and Jefferson
was not likely to go there to be sued
for that which he could not be sued for
at his home in Virginia.
17. Code of Civ. Proc. § 338.
18. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.
2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 27 A.L.R.3d
884 (1967); in malpractice actions the
statute of limitations does not commence to run until patient discovers his
injury or in exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.
19. 241 Cal. App.2d 520, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1966).
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her husand told her about the extent of the community property, and she received $8,807 as her share; it was discovered
later that the value of community property totaled $82,500.00. Ascribing her loss to the failure of attorney Millington
to make inquiries as to the true value of the community property, she brought suit to recover the loss sustained. The attorney assumed that she knew what she was doing, and believed
she was getting what she was entitled to receive but made no
effort to ascertain whether his belief was correct. The trial
court entered summary judgment for the defendant.
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on the basis
that there were definite factual issues to be tried. Justice
Friedman wrote a very significant opinion. There was a
duty to exercise reasonable care. The representation of both
parties by counsel is allowed only in "exceptional" situations.
In such situations, the attorney must disclose all facts which
would be required by another lawyer. Legal malpractice may
consist of a negligent failure to act, and such failure need not
be the sole cause of the client's loss. Here he failed to advise,
to investigate, and to disclose. The case was sent back for
trial.
Justice Friedman's observations on the state of the practice
in this area of law are worthy of note. He wrote,
Divorces are frequently uncontested; the parties may
make their financial arrangements peaceably and honestly; vestigial chivalry may impel them to display the wife as
the injured plaintiff; the husband may then seek out and
pay an attorney to escort the wife through the formalities
of adjudication. We describe these facts of life without
necessarily approving them. Even in that situation, the
attorney's professional obligations do not permit his
descent to the level of a scrivener. The edge of danger
gleams if the attorney has previously represented the husband. 20
20. 241 Cal. App.2d 520, 527, 50
Cal. Rptr. 592, 596.
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C. Products Liability
In last year's study of this subject, we examined Elmore v.
American Motors Corporation/ in which parts of the Elmore
automobile seemed to have fallen from underneath, causing
Mrs. Elmore to lose control, wrecking the car, killing her, and
injuring the Waters family, which was traveling in the opposite
direction. The case seemingly raised the question whether
the strict liability of the manufacturer would extend to thirdparty non-users if liability were established as to the users.
The Court of Appeal held that the case for strict liability had
not been proved, so the rights of non-users were not considered. We intimated that this was a wrong decision, and,
as the article went to press, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeal, deciding that it was a case for application of
the doctrine. A footnote reporting the reversal was included
in our text, pointing out that the Court decided that liability
would extend to the Waters family as third-party non-users.
The story is now complete. Privity had long been eliminated from the ordinary cases charging negligence on the part
of manufacturers; MacPherson v. Buick Company2 and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors 3 settled that. The question here
was simply whether the more rigid doctrine of strict liability
would be extended under similar circumstances. That it will
is now clearly settled in Californa. The following case decided during the past year applies the new ruling. In Johnson v.
Standard Brands Paint CO.,4 Johnson, an independent contractor, was killed when he fell from a ladder while working in a
building. He was standing on his own ladder and near him
was an aluminum extension ladder on which another man was
working. The aluminum ladder next to Johnson's had been
purchased from the defendant, Standard Brands Paint Co.
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1. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
451 P.2d 84 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Bernhardt,
REAL PROPERTY, in this volume. Moreau, TORTS, Cal Law-Trends and Developments 1969, pp. 392-402.

Ann. Cas. 1916 C. 440, L.R.AI916 F.
696 (1916).
3. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69, 75
AL.R.2d 1 (1960).
4. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1969).

2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050,
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This ladder had been defectively designed, and the defect
caused its legs to slip or slide away from the wall and it fell
against the ladder on which Johnson was standing, causing
him to fall to his death. Plaintiff secured a favorable verdict
at trial which was affirmed. On appeal, defendants sought
to distinguish a ladder case from an automobile case. The
Court indicated that it was simply a question whether injury
to a person in the position of the deceased was foreseeable.
Strict liability is not limited to products that are inherently
dangerous. In fact, in Elmore, the Court thought that bystanders should be entitled to even greater protection than
users when injury to them is foreseeable. In these cases,
privity thinking plays no part. Foreseeability of harm to bystanders is an issue for the trier of fact. It is immaterial that
the precise manner in which the injury came about was not
clearly foreseeable, because the exact or particular chain of
events in the occurrence does not overthrow the end result if it
was reasonably foreseeable. The bystander, however, must
supply the same proof as the user. He must show that the
product was used normally and for its intended use. It did
appear that the ladder was upright, but with its rails more than
four feet from the wall against which it stood. Everyone
knows that ladders will slide away from the wall if used at an
improper angle. There was conflicting evidence on the question of improper use which, being a question of fact, was solely
within the province of the jury. Improper use would not
necessarily be effective to bar the right to recover if it were
shown such use most probably resulted from a failure to warn,
and that the method of use was reasonably foreseeable. Here,
the Court emphasizes that no warnings were given. 5
The doctrine was extended to a lessor of personal property
in the case of McCla{iin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co. 6
This was another ladder case where death resulted. Decedent
was a self-employed installer of draperies. There were some

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/11

5. The failure to warn as a defect
was also emphasized in Barth v. B. F.
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App.2d
228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968). In fact,
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the failure to warn about the danger of
overloading the tires was the defect.
6. 274 Cal. App. 2d '-, 79 Cal. Rptr.
337 (1969).
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vertical cracks in one of the step-bearing legs of the ladder,
which caused the ladder to collapse while plaintiff was using
it. Defendants claimed that the cracks were caused by plaintiff's improper use of the ladder and, alternately, that if the
cracks existed at the time of rental, plaintiff knew about them
and therefore assumed the risk. Plaintiffs sought an instruction on strict liability that was refused, and defendant prevailed. On appeal, the Court agreed with plaintiff's contention that the refusal to so instruct was improper and reversed.
The Court took the position that Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc. 7 overthrew the doctrine of warranty as a basis
to impose liability on a purveyor of a defective chattel. Warranty is now overboard, so that the liability is no longer based
on contract. Strict liability can now rest on a liability entirely
free of the contractual relationship or privity. Reliance was
placed on Elmore 8 and Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co. 9 Defendants sought to make the decedent a lessee-bailee, and as
such not entitled to the benefit of strict liability. The Court
pointed out that strict liability had been extended to a retail
buyer, a buyer's employee, and a mere bystander, unconnected
with the chattel's purveyor except as an ultimate victim. Lessors are engaged in distributing goods to the public, and are
an integral part of the overall marketing enterprise, therefore
they should bear the cost of injuries resulting from the proper
use of the defective products that they place in the stream
of commerce. 10
The stream of commerce is being enlarged to include all
those who participate in the marketing of a product. The
previously mentioned Goodrich case held that installers of the
tires were also subject to strict liability even though they were
not true sellers.
In last year's article, we asked the question whether res ipsa
loquitur could be used in connection with establishing strict
7. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963).
8. Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,
70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451
P.2d 84 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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Rptr. 306 (1968).
10. Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.
2d 769 (1965).
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liability.ll It was thought that some cases mentioned that this
was a possibility.12 In such cases, inferences as to the liability
of the manufacturer could be made from the circumstances as
well as by res ipsa loquitur, but, of course, res ipsa could be
limited to proving ordinary negligence.
In the case of Tresham v. Ford Motor CO.,t3 this possible
uncertainty was resolved. Inferring a defect in design and
manufacture from circumstances is different from inferring
negligence when applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In
strict liability cases, the liability is not based on negligence at
all. Strict liability evolved from the warranty concept with
which res ipsa loquitur has no connection.14 It follows that
when a plaintiff seeks to impose strict liability, the requirement
of showing a defect cannot be satisfied by reliance on res ipsa
loquitur. But the fact remains that inferences are made in
both strict liability and in negligence cases. Tresham is a
good opinion clarifying the issues in both types of cases. It
indicates that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is limited to the
negligence issue only.ls

D. Nondelegable Duty
In Maloney v. Rath,t6 a simple set of facts led to clarification of an automobile owner's obligation to maintain his car
in such condition that it satisfies all statutory requirements,
and thereby assures the safety of other road users. Plaintiff
stopped in the left lane of a highway and waited to make a left
turn. Defendant came from behind and, because of a sudden
unexpected failure of her brakes, rear-ended plaintiff's car
and caused injuries to the plaintiff and to plaintiff's car. Plaintiff sued for damages. After a verdict for defendant, because
the explanation showed defendant was not at fault, plaintiff
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12. Ghema v. Ford Motor Co., 246
Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1966).
13. 275 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr.
883 (1969).
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14. See Trust v Arden Farms Co., 50
Cal.2d 217, 324 P.2d 583, 81 A.L.R.2d
332 (1958).
15. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1969).
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moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; the court
denied it. Plaintiff appealed.
Defendant explained the accident occurred because of a
rubbing of a wheel on the brake line, weakening it, allowing
it to rupture suddenly on application of the brakes and causing
an immediate loss of braking power. She had had the brakes
fully overhauled three months earlier by a good mechanic,
and they were examined again two weeks before the accident.
Defendant was assured by her mechanic, an independent contractor, that her brakes were in excellent condition. She also
explained that she had no notice of the impending failure, as
it occurred suddenly without prior indication of malfunction.
On the theory that this negatived failure to exercise care with
reference to the requirements of the then existing Vehicle
Code section 26300, and section 26453, as to brakes and
equipment, defendant was not held liable. The defendant
argued that she had done all that could be expected of a person of ordinary prudence. Defendant was relying on Alarid v.
Vanier,17 which refused to apply strict liability under similar
circumstances. Plaintiff asked the Court to reconsider its decision in Alarid and impose strict liability on the defendant.
Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the Court, adhered to the
Alarid decision, refusing to apply the strict liability rule to
such cases, but nevertheless held the defendant liable on the
theory that she was under a nondelegable duty to keep her
automobile equipped as required by the Vehicle Code. The
opinion is documented with some seven situations where
California has held parties liable under duties which were not
delegable. IS
Sections 423 and 424 of the Restatement of Torts support
17. 50 Ca1.2d 617, 327 P.2d 897
(1958).
18. These include (a) where a party
is given a franchise by public authority;
(b) a condemning agent must protect a
severed parcel from damage; (c) a general contractor has a nondelegable duty
to construct a building safely; (d) an
owner retains a duty when hiring an in-
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the holding in this case, especially section 423. 19 Under this
section the statutory duty is not delegable; the owner of the
car remains liable. Such a duty is of the utmost importance to
the public.
There is, of course, considerable difference between this
holding and one that would place defendant under a strict liability. Probably the most important difference is that defenses
applicable to a negligence action will remain; both contributory negligence and assumption of risk are available to the
defendant. Also, no doubt, if defendant pays, she will be
entitled to indemnity from her contractor for his breach of
contract or for his negligent failure to discover what a reasonable inspection would have revealed.
This is a policy decision highly beneficial to the public. As
between the plaintiff, who has not been at fault at all, and the
defendant, whose defective equipment caused the damage, it is
more just that defendant should make the plaintiff whole, even
though the defendant was not actively at fault.
The nondelegable duty is well grounded in our law. It is
not new. In 1935, a New York court noted the general rule
that one who hired a contractor to do work for him was not
liable for the negligence of such independent contractor. 20 It
added, however, that there are so many exceptions to the rule
that the rule itself no longer exists. It originated prior to the
industrial revolution. The opinion of the Court in Maloney
proves that the exceptions practically nullify the rule. And we
can expect more such exceptions. Probably the best study
of the problem was made by Professor Steffen in his study
titled "Independent Contractor and the Good Life,"l made in
19. Section 423 of the Restatement
of Torts states:
"One who carries on an activity which
threatens a grave risk of serious bodily
harm or death unless the instrumentalities used are carefully constructed and
maintained, and who employs an independent contractor to construct or maintain those instrumentalities is subject to
the same liability for physical harm
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/11 322

caused by the negligence of the contractor in constructing or maintaining such
instrumentalities as though the employer himself had done the work of construction and maintenance."
20. Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Const. Co.,
154 Misc. 892, 278 N.Y.S. 635 (1935).
1. 2 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. pp. 501532 (1934-35).
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1933. His capacity to dissect and lay bare so-called well accepted doctrine is refreshing indeed.
In the later case of Clark v. Dziabas, 2 another case involving
defective brakes, the State Supreme Court clarified the holding
of the Maloney case. The Court stated that in order to establish a defense to liability for damages caused by a brake
failure, the owner must establish two things: (a) that he did
what would be expected of a reasonably prudent person under
the circumstances and (b) that the employees or independent
contractors to whom the inspection was delegated were not
negligent. In other words, the Maloney case does not impose
an absolute liability. In Maloney the contractors were negligent. If neither the owner nor his agents are negligent there
is no liability. In Clark, the defendant had rebutted his own
negligence, but not that of his agents. For this reason, the
trial court committed error in denying plaintiff's motion for
judgment notwithstanding a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff was granted a new trial. On retrial, the defendant will
have an opportunity to establish that the defect in the brakes
was there when he purchased the car and that a careful inspection by his agents would not have revealed the defect. In that
event, the breach of the nondelegable duty would not be
proved.

III. Interspousal Imputation of Negligence
A. In General
Interspousal imputation of negligence in California has undergone so many judicial and legislative modifications that a
developmental overview is perhaps the best method of bringing
this subject up to date.
The effect of imputation of negligence is either to create a
liability or to impose a disability. That portion of the doctrine which creates a vicarious liability, as in the case of the
master being responsible for the torts of his servant, has found
.2. 69 Cal.2d 449, 71 Cal. Rptr. 901,
445 P.2d 517 (1968); Dutcher v. Weber,
275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 378.
CAL LAW 1970
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favor in modern tort law as a means of allocating risk to those
in a more favorable position to either bear the financial burden
or pass it on to the community at large. s On the other hand,
that branch of the doctrine which imposes a disability by imputing contributory negligence to defeat the claim of an otherwise innocent person has generally been viewed with disfavor
by both the courts and legislatures.
The community property system, which generally works to
protect and preserve the property rights of the wife, has traditionally posed special problems in the area of tort recovery.
The fault rationale of tort law and the concepts of community
property combined to deny recovery to an innocent wife injured as a result of the concurring negligence of her husband
and a third party, since a wrongdoing spouse would otherwise
be unjustly enriched by his community share of the recovery.
Consequently, both the cause of action and damages recovered
for personal injury to either the husband or wife were held
to be community property, and the negligence of one spouse
was imputed to the other to bar recovery.4 Past legislation, by
dealing with specific inequities without affecting the source
of these problems, has been much like plugging holes in a dike,
merely suppressing a particular symptom only to have it reappear in a different form. It now appears a new and better
dike has been built.
B. A Brief Historical Perspective

Since a wrongdoer sharing in a recovery offended traditional
negligence thinking, dissolution of the community provided a
logical basis for refusing to impose the doctrine. Consequently, in 1952, it was held that where the negligent spouse had
died and could no longer benefit from his own wrong, the imputation of negligence rule would not apply.5 Four years
later, a similar rule was announced where the community was
dissolved by divorce, the court holding that a spouse's entire

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/11

3. Prosser, Law of Torts, 3d ed., p.
471.
4. Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254,
273 P2d 257 (1954); Zaragosa v. Crav324

en, 33 Ca1.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.
2d 461 (1949).
5. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622,
248 P.2d 922 (1952).
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cause of action vested by operation of law and could not be
dealt with by a divorce court. 6 An effort to achieve a similar
result by the negligent spouse's release of his community
property interest in any recovery, making such the separate
property of the innocent spouse, was held ineffective to prevent
application of the doctrine where such agreement was reached
after the cause of action arose. 7 However, where the wife was
living separate from the husband when the cause of action
arose, with no intention of resuming the marital relationship,
it was held that the then existing Civil Code section 169 makes
such cause of action the separate property of the wife. 8
In 1957, the legislature attempted to remedy the inequities
created by the clash of tort and community property concepts
by adding section 163.5 to the Civil Code, which made "all
damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a
civil action for personal injuries . . . the separate property
of such married person."9 The effect of this statutory change
was far from being as pervasively corrective as intended and,
as subsequently demonstrated, it wrought its own brand of
injustice.
Vehicle Code section 17150, which imputed the negligence
of the permissive user of an automobile to its owner/a was
perhaps the most significant reason why Civil Code section
163.5 had only limited success. The term owner, by definition, extends beyond the limitations of record title. Since
most vehicles acquired during the marriage are community
property, a strict construction of Vehicle Code section 17150
would, in the majority of instances, result in the imputation of
negligence of husband-driver upon the injured wife-passenger.
This contention was rejected in Shepardson v. McLellan ll
where the automobile, although admittedly community prop6. Washington v. Washington, 47 Cal.
2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956).
7. Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273
P.2d 257 (1954).
8. Christiana v. Rose, 100 Cal. App.
2d 46, 222 P.2d 891 (1950).
9. Civ. Code § 163.5, Stats. 1957,
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10. Vehicle Code § 17150, Stats.
1957, Ch. 3.
11. 59 Cal.2d 83, 27 Cal. Rptr. 884,
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erty, was registered solely to the husband whose contributory
negligence the defendant sought to impute to the wife-passenger to bar the recovery she was seeking for her injuries.
The Court in explaining its refusal to impute the husband's
negligence to the wife stated:
. because the husband has control and management of the community property, no consent of the wife,
express or implied, to his use of the community vehicle
registered in his name, can add anything to his existing
right to use the vehicle; . . .12
Imputation of negligence could be found when title to the
vehicle was recorded in both names because of the presumption of Civil Code section 164 that property acquired by an
instrument in writing by a married woman is her separate
property.13 In Cooke v. Tsipouroglou 14 the trial court's denial
of recovery sought by an injured passenger-wife was affirmed
even though both plaintiff and her husband had testified that
it was their intention to hold the vehicle as community property. The certificate of ownership listed the registered owner
as "Cooke, Jack or Margaret." The Court found the testimony of plaintiff and her husband merely created a conflict
which the trial court was free to resolve against plaintiff. In
other words, following the presumption created by Civil Code
section 164, in the absence of any specific designation on the
certificate of ownership as to how title was held, the Court
accepted the trial court's finding that the automobile was not
community property but rather that it was held by a tenancyin-common. The consequence of this form of ownership is a
right of management and control existing in the wife which
would not exist if the vehicle were held as community property.
It is the right of management and control which carries with it
the burden of imputation of negligence under Vehicle Code
section 17150. Hence, a determination of the nature of own12. 59 Cal.2d 83, 87, 27 Cal. Rptr.
884, 887, 378 P.2d 108, 111.
13. Civ. Code § 164, amended by
Stats. 1927, Ch. 487, § 1; p. 826; repealed Stats. 1969, Ch. 1608, § 3.
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ership is vital where a defendant seeks to impute the contributory negligence of the driver-spouse to the passenger-spouse.
Of the four types of ownership-separate, community, tenancy-in-common, and joint tenancy-only community ownership is free of the burden of imputation of negligence where
the accident occurred prior to 1967. 15
Shifting their attention to the Vehicle Code, the legislature
made two more attempts to complete the task they started in
1957. In 1965, they added section 17150.5, which made
the presumptions created by Civil Code section 164 inapplicable to an action based on Vehicle Code section 17150
with respect to the ownership of a motor vehicle by a married
woman and her husband. 16 This attempt to remedy the situation which arose in Cooke fell short of its intended mark and
negligence was still imputed where the ownership was clearly
other than community. The same section was again amended
in 1967,17 for the express purpose of preventing the imputation
of the driver's contributory negligence to an otherwise innocent owner in order to defeat the owner's claim for damages
against a negligent third party. IS This was accomplished by
deleting the words ". . . shall be imputed to the owner for
all purposes of civil damages." This amendment does, however, preserve the protection afforded those damaged by the
negligence of permissive users by imposing financial liability
on the owners of vehicles without the necessity of resorting
to the artifice of imputing negligence.
In 1968, the legislature made two particularly significant
statutory changes. First, Civil Code section 163.5, now repealed, was amended to again return personal injury recoveries
15. Hooper v. Romero, 262 Cal. App.
2d 574, 68 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1968).
16. Vehicle Code § 17150.5, added
by Stats. 1965, Ch. 1598, § 1.
17. Vehicle Code § 17150, amended
by Stats. 1967, Ch. 702, § 1.
18. Legislative Committee Comment
in Senate makes this intent abundantly
clear: ". . . The last clause of §
17150 has been deleted because it, toCAL LAW 1970
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negligent third person." Vehicle Code
§ 17150, Supp p. 218.
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by either spouse to community property status. 19 Second, in
order to prevent a return to the interspousal imputation of negligence originally dictated by the community property status
of such recoveries, Civil Code section 164.6 was enacted,
though now repealed, eliminating the concurring negligence
of the other spouse as a defense to an action brought by the
. in cases
injured spouse against a third party except".
where such concurring negligent or wrongful act or omission
would be a defense if the marriage would not exist."20
The earlier legislative preoccupation with negativing the
effect of imputing negligence to the innocent spouse had, perhaps, limited its vision as to the ultimate reach of Civil Code
section 163.5, now repealed, which extended beyond the situation involving the other spouse's contributory negligence.
Personal injuries frequently mean large medical bills paid from
community resources and an impairment of earning capacity,
often the most significant community asset. Section 163.5
made no allowance for reimbursement to the community for
these losses, even in situations where the other spouse was in
no way involved in causation of the injury. Consequently, although the injury might result in a substantial depletion
of community assets, the recovery, being the separate property
of the injured spouse, was subject to that spouse's unrestricted
disposition. The hardship imposed on the marital partner became particularly apparent in the division of property on dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce. 1
Civil Code section 163.5, as amended, provided that personal injury recoveries were separate property only when paid
by the other spouse. This had the effect of preserving the right
of one spouse to sue the other for civil wrongs. All other recoveries are community property.
Although neither Vehicle Code section 17150 as amended
in 1967, nor Civil Code section 164.6 as added in 1968, but
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20. Stats 1968, Ch. 457, § 3.
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now repealed, have been tested at the appellate level, it would
appear that the legislature has, at last, achieved success by
the simple, direct approach of restricting the use of the doctrine of imputation of negligence rather than further attempts
at restructuring the community property system.
C. A Brief Summary

Prior to 1957, the contributory negligence of the husband
could be imputed to an otherwise innocent wife to defeat her
personal injury cause of action, because the recovery she might
obtain would be shared by the community. From 1957
through 1967, although personal injury recoveries became the
separate property of the injured spouse, the contributory negligence of the husband in an automobile accident could still be
imputed to the wife to defeat her claim if her ownership of the
vehicle could be shown to be other than ownership as community property. In other words, if she held separate title or held
as a tentant-in-common or in joint tenancy with her husband,
negligence had to be imputed by operation of Vehicle Code
section 17150. The defendant's burden of showing separate
ownership was easier prior to 1965, when he could invoke the
presumptions of now repealed Civil Code section 164. The
exceptions to the pre-1957 dictates of imputing contributory
negligence because of the community property status of the
recovery were: (1) dissolution of the marriage by death or
divorce, (2) the wife living separate from her husband when
the cause of action arose and (3) possibly an agreement, making personal injury recoveries the separate property of each
spouse, executed before the cause of action arose. 2 In 1968,
Vehicle Code section 17150, as amended, became effective,
preventing imputation of the permissive user's contributory
negligence to defeat the claim of an otherwise innocent
owner.
In 1969, Civil Code section 164.6, although already repealed, was to have become effective and expressly forbid defeasance of the injured spouse's third-party action based on the
2. This is the implication of Kesler
v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273 P.2d 257
CAL LAW 1970
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contributory negligence of the other spouse, except where such
concurring negligence or wrongful act or omission would be
a defense if the marriage did not exist.
IV. Workmen's Compensation v. Tort Liability Under Respondeat Superior
A. The Going and Coming Rule

If an employee injures a third person while driving to and
from the job site, it is often difficult to decide whether the
employee was in the course of his employment so as to make
the employer, as well as the employee, liable to the injured
party. This was the situation in Harris v. Oro-Dam Constructors.3 The jury returned a verdict against the defendant driver
Byers, but in favor of the defendant employer, on the basis that
the employee was not on the job. The plaintiff appealed.
Byers, the employee, lived 23 miles from the job site and
received a daily stipend of $6.00 as a transportation allowance, but the allowance did not cover travel time. The socalled going and corning rule limits liability under respondeat
superior to on-site liability of the employer. The employer-'
employee relationship is suspended when the employee leaves
for horne, for it is said that he is no longer in the scope of
his employment. The Court affirmed on the basis that the
driving was principally for the benefit of the employee and only
tangentially for the benefit of the employer, and further that
the employer had no control over the employee during the
driving. These two words then, benefit and control form the
basis of the decision. The opinion emphasizes that in this
type of a case the question is one of fault, and is therefore distinguishable from the workmen's compensation cases where
the question is one of compensation, and is a matter that involves whether the injury occurs or arises "out of and in the
course of employment."
Plaintiff relied on those compensation cases which recognize
certain exceptions to the going and corning rule. If the
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employer expects the employee to drive his own car to work,
any injury during the driving to and from work is employmentconnected and is therefore compensable. The trip is indirectly
beneficial to the employer, and so the suspension of the relationship is not indicated.
The most recent case on the workmen's compensation exception to the going and coming rule is Zenith National Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. 4 Here
the employee sustained serious injuries while enroute to the
job site 130 miles from his home. Justice Tobriner points out
that California has no statute on the subject matter which
would deny compensation, but that the decisions have applied
a similar rule. 5 The rule is premised on the theory that the
relationship of employer and employee is suspended from the
time he leaves his work. Justice Tobriner then indicates that
the relationship may be found to continue on particular facts.
Here the facts consisted of (a) the great distance-130 miles,
(b) the employer's compensating the employee $10 a day
to cover transportation costs and living expenses, (c) the
employer's furnishing transportation when the employee was
unable to arrange it and (d) the extra payment as an inducement to the worker to take the job. These facts were deemed
to justify the conclusion that the injuries arose "out of and
in the course of employment."
Certainly these two cases bring the problem of creating a
liability to third parties by respondeat superior, and of compensating employees for injuries received during travel time,
into an interesting contrast. Tort liability is one thing, but
compensation for an employee quite another. Tort requires
fault, but compensation for work-incurred injury is usually
made irrespective of fault. Fault is almost always immaterial in workmen's compensation cases. Yet if the employer
is at fault also, what he pays his employee under the dictates
of the Workmen's Compensation Act is deductible from any
recovery as damages from any third person who happens to
4. 66 Cal.2d 944, 59 Cal. Rptr. 622,
428 P.2d 606 (1967).
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be liable also. 6 Yet the employer, if not at fault, gets indemnity for his payments from the wrongdoer. 7
It will be interesting to observe whether the workmen's
compensation exception to the going and coming rule will
eventually be extended to encompass liability to third parties.
V. Indemnity
A. In General

As observed in last year's article,S indemnity is a shifting
of an entire liability from one party to another. It differs
from contribution, which is a sharing of liability between
parties held jointly liable. Generally, there are two types
of indemnity, contractual and noncontractual; the former is
based on the agreement of the parties, the latter is implied
by law. The extent of liability in contract cases is governed
basically by contract law although such contracts are often
connected with tort cases.
B. Contractual Indemnity

Within the policy limits, the standard automobile liability
insurance policy provides for indemnity to be paid by the
insurance carrier to the assured for whatever amounts are
due from the assured to an injured party. Cases like Davidson
v. Welch 9 demonstrate how complex these relationships can
become. Welch owned and operated an automobile repair
shop which he leased to Davidson, and agreed with Davidson
to continue its operation, as Davidson's employee. As such,
Welch became an owner-lessor-employee, and Davidson became a lessee-employer. The lessee had agreed to save the
lessor harmless in his relationship with the public in conducting the business. So when Welch, the lessor-employee, had
6. De Cruz v. Reid, 69 Cal.2d 217,
70 Cal. Rptr. 550, 444 P.2d 342 (1968).
7. Lab. Code § 3852.
8. Moreau, TORTS, Cal Law-Trends
and Developments 1969, pp. 414-420.
9. 270 Cal. App.2d 220, 75 Cal. Rptr.
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an altercation with a customer and the customer sued Welch,
Welch, in his capacity as lessor of the business, was entitled to
have Davidson and his insurer defend the suit unless, of
course, Welch, in his capacity as an employee, was guilty of a
wilful act in striking the customer. If what he did was in
the course of the employment, the insurance contract would
inure to the benefit of Welch. Here tort and contract went
hand in hand. The Court observed that generally the
employer is entitled to indemnity from his employee if he
has to pay damages for the negligence of his employee.
Here, however, the situation was reversed, for the employee
was seeking indemnity from the employer and his insurer on
the basis of the lease agreement. The Court allowed the indemnity, since the conduct of the employee was found to be
in the course of the employment.
For an extreme case allowing indemnity or subrogation
on a contractual basis, see Meyer Koulish Co. v. Cannon. 10
Here jewelry was consigned to defendants under an agreement which placed all loss on defendants. The jewelry was
stolen without any fault of the defendants. Koulish's insurer
paid the loss and then Koulish and the insurer sued defendants for indemnity and recovered. Ordinarily, a paid insurer
is not entitled to reimbursement from someone not at fault. l l
The Koulish case is severely criticized in a more recent case,12
in which the Supreme Court denied a hearing, thus reaffirming
Meyers v. Bank of America/3 which refused to allow an insurer for a fee to be subrogated to the rights of its insured
against a party who, though innocent of fault, was technically
liable (i.e., as in the case of an innocent purchaser for value
from a thief-in such cases the courts treat the paid insurer
and the innocent converter as having equal equities, thus
refusing to aid either one). Koulish indicates that contractual
indemnity, regardless of fault, can lead to inequitable results.
10. 213 Cal. App.2d 419, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 757 (1963).
11. Meyers v. Bank of America Nat.
Trust & Savings Assn., 11 Cal.2d 92,
77 P.2d 1084 (1938).
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C. Implied Indemnity

In tort, we are primarily concerned with noncontractual
indemnity, that is, the implied indemnity created by equity
and brought about by or obtained by subrogation or an action
seeking indemnity. These cases usually arise where there is
a special relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee, such as principal and agent, employee and employer,
partner and partner, or a party who when under a nondelegable duty employs a contractor to do the work for him, and
also where a party permits someone to drive his car who injures a third person. When the permittor (owner) pays the
injured person he is entitled to indemnity from the permittee
(driver) . These cases are simple enough. The party paying
the loss must do so not because of any personal negligence,
but because the law dictates his responsibility either by statute, imputation of negligence or the nondelegable duty. The
relationship of the party paying the loss to the one whose active
negligence caused the loss dictates that restitution should be
granted. The one seeking indemnity has simply conferred
a benefit on the indemnitor in having paid an obligation of
such person. Removing a liability is clearly a benefit.
In City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing,14 decided
in 1958, a case not involving an employer-employee situation
nor any relationship between the parties was presented. The
City of San Francisco is required to keep its streets safe for
the public. Ho Sing, a businessman, made changes in the
street paving in front of his place of business, and rendered
the street unsafe for pedestrians. A pedestrian was injured
and sued both the city and Ho Sing, securing a joint judgment
against both. The city paid half of the judgment and sued to
recover its payment from Ho Sing, thus seeking to place the
whole loss on Ho Sing. The Court allowed the suit for indemnity on the basis that the change of the condition of the street
was made solely for the benefit of the private owner, and
therefore the party who created the condition should indemnify
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the city, which became liable for failure to remove the danger
when it had notice of the condition. At the same time, the
Court recognized that the duty of the city was not dependent
on, nor derivative from, the liability of the private owner as
in the employer-employee cases. The city was jointly and
severally liable with the private owner. What the Court did
here was to distinguish positive wrongdoing from negative
wrongdoing, or rather active conduct from mere failure to
act, sins of commission from those of omission.
This is the point where the two dissenting justices, Schauer
and McComb, departed from their brethren, like Episcopalians who repeat the confession of having not only done
the things they should not have done, but also having not
done things they should have done. The latter is just as bad
as the former. Both types of wrongdoing are equal before
the law; therefore, the dissenters argued, the parties were liable
jointly and severally, and were equally liable for the injuries
that resulted. The majority recognized the strength of the
argument, but still allowed indemnity. Perhaps the real basis
for the holding was equitable considerations; without indemnity there would have been enrichment of the private owner at
the expense of the city or the public. Such enrichment was
unjust, and gave rise to an implied promise to make payment
of all the damage suffered.
Contribution and implied indemnity are both remedies for
achieving substantial justice between those who are, in the
eyes of the law, wrongdoers. As between the two remedies,
indemnity is by far the more drastic. Whereas contribution
spreads the loss between two or more tortfeasors, indemnity
shifts the entire loss from one to the other. At common law
there was no right of contribution between persons jointly or
severally liable. It was not until 1957 that our legislature
enacted a contribution statute. 15 The Ho Sing case, decided
in 1958, recognized the right to implied indemnity. Whereas
the remedy of contribution is restricted statutorily,16 the right
15. Code of Civ. Proc. § 875. et. seq.
16. Part (a) of c.c.P. § 875 requires
money jlldgment . . .
a
rendered jointly against tl\'O or more
H.

•

•
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to implied indemnity is not confined by statute, and consequently has enjoyed a general liberalization of availability.
Since Ho Sing, those whose liability was only secondary
have routinely been allowed indemnity from those primarily
liable, as have those whose negligence was characterized as
only passive been granted recovery from those whose active
negligence created the harm.l7 Although distinguishing between active and passive negligence has given our courts no
small amount of difficulty /8 such is not the focus of our present
case analysis. Recent decisions have directed our attention to
the question of whether a difference in the degree of negligence or a disparity of culpability between tortfeasors is to
be accepted in California as a basis for granting implied indemnity.
Section 96 of the Restatement of Restitution, allows indemnity to one who without personal fault has been compelled to defray expenses caused to a third person by the
unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another. The underlying reasons are stated in other language by Professor Prosser, as involving (a) the community feeling or opinion as to
whether justice dictates the restitution to one tortfeasor as
against another, or (b) because of the relation of the parties
to one another or (c) perhaps because there is a real difference
in the degree of culpability of the parties. l9
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choose where to place the entire loss
in circumstances where two or more
wrongdoers would be jointly or severally liable for the victim's damage; the
statute makes no provision for a defendant to interplead another wrongdoer whom plaintiff has either overlooked or knowingly chose not to sue.
Part (c) requires discharge of the
joint judgment by the party seeking contribution.
Part (d) denies the right of contribution to the tortfeasor who has intentionally injured another.
17. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal.
App.2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 8 A.L.R.
3d 629 (1964); Pierce v. Turner, 205
Cal. App.2d 264, 23 Cal. Rptr. 115
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(1962); Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina
Co., 208 Cal. App.2d 367, 25 Cal Rptr.
301 (1962); American Can Co. v. City
and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal.
App.2d 520, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962).
18. For an excellent discussion of
this area of the problem, see Cahill
Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal.
App.2d 367, 381, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301,
309 (1962).
19. Prosser, Law 0/ Torts, 3rd ed., p.
281. See also Bohlen, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tort/easors, 21
Corn. L.Q. 552 (1935-36); Hodges,
Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tort/easors, 26 Texas L. Rev. p. 150
(1947-48).
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In the 1961 Wisconsin case of Jacobs v. General Accident
Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,20 the Court held that a tortfeasor guilty of only simple negligence could not get indemnity
from another tortfeasor who was grossly negligent. The
Court held there was no injustice in imposing some of the
burden of compensation on one whose negligence had directly
contributed to the loss suffered.
We now consider two California cases concerning whether
the degree of culpability is a sound basis for shifting losses
where the losses were paid by one whose degree of culpability was less than that of the other wrongdoer. In Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lan Franco/ a collision
occurred between a Santa Fe passenger train and a truck
owned by Whitehead Construction Company and driven by
Lan Franco. Plaintiff, a passenger on the train, was injured
and sued three parties: the Santa Fe Railway, the Whitehead
Construction Company and the estate of the decedent driver
of the truck. Santa Fe filed a cross complaint against the
construction company for indemnity in the event it was held
liable. The Court dismissed the cross complaint and an appeal
was taken from the dismissal. As stated by Justice Kerrigan
of the Court of Appeal, the issue was where to allocate the loss.
Here, as between Santa Fe and the construction company,
there was no relationship, contractual or otherwise, so it was
a clear case of implied indemnity if there were to be indemnity
at all. Santa Fe sought indemnity on the basis that its duty
towards the injured parties was of a different character and
degree from the duty owed by the construction company. The
duty of Santa Fe, as a common carrier, was to exercise the
highest degree of care, whereas that of the construction company was to exercise ordinary care. The duty of the railway
was higher and therefore it was liable if it breached its duty
of utmost care. On the other hand, the construction company
was liable if it failed to exercise ordinary care. Accordingly,
Santa Fe argued that its liability derived from technical fault.
They claimed to be only passively negligent, while the con20. 14 Wis.2d I, 109 N.W.2d 462,
88 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1961).
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struction company was actively negligent. In other words,
the railroad sought to ground its right of indemnity on the
basis of comparative fault, that is, the relative responsibilities
of the parties.
Santa Fe relied for authority on the federal court case of
United Airlines v. Wiener.2 There two aircraft collided, one
an Air Force jet and the other a commercial airliner. The
argument was made that the commercial airline company
owed the same high degree of care to its passengers as Santa
Fe, and that the Air Force jet owed a duty of ordinary care
to the passengers in the plane. In the airline case the United
States Court of Appeals allowed indemnity to the airline from
the United States. The Court said,
In view of the disparity of duties, the clear disparity of
culpability, the likely operation of the last clear chance
doctrine and all the surrounding circumstances, . . .
we hold that there are such differences in the contrasted
character of fault as to warrant indemnity in favor of
United [Airlines] . . .3
Although the Court was sitting in California, it applied
Nevada law, and as such, was only secondary authority when
offered to support Santa Fe's position.
The Court of Appeal, in an excellent opinion by Justice
Kerrigan, took the position that the argument was based
on the doctrine of comparative negligence, a doctrine not
recognized at common law and not favored today except by
law professors. This is different from our doctrine of primary
and secondary negligence. The railroad company could not
be held liable for Whitehead's wrongdoing, but would be liable
for its own failure to exercise the care that the law exacted
of it. The Court cited King v. Timber Structures, Inc.,4 and
concluded that differences in the degree of negligence or comparative negligence are inconsequential under the law of equitable indemnity.
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2. 335 F.2d 379 (1964) Cert. Dis. in
379 U.S. 951, 13 L.Ed. 2d 549, 85 S.Ct.
452.
3. 335 F.2d 379, 402 Cert. Dis. in
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4. 240 Cal. App.2d 178, 49 Cal. Rptr.
414 (1966).
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It is significant that another case arose out of this same collision that was reviewed by the Court of Appeal, Second
District, in which Justice Wood came to the same conclusion
as did Justice Kerrigan in the Fourth District.
We may hope to wrestle with a similar situation arising
under our guest statute. If a guest is riding in an automobile
which collides with another vehicle, and the driver of the car
in which the guest is riding is intoxicated, making him liable
under the guest statute, and the driver of the other car is guilty
of only failing to exercise ordinary care, and a joint judgment
is recovered against both-will the third party driver be
entitled to indemnity from the intoxicated driver on the basis
of the comparative degrees of culpability? If we can look
from the highest degree of care to ordinary negligence, why not
look from ordinary negligence to the lowest degree of care?
No doubt this issue will eventually be decided by the State
Supreme Court. We will then know whether disparity of
culpability will eventually form an acceptable basis for indemnity.
How can we justify the total shifting of a liability when we
restrict the sharing of liability as we do? This complete
shift finds similar thinking in our refusal to adopt a rule of
comparative negligence. Under our present system, a plaintiff who is only slightly negligent sustains the burden of his
losses. It resembles the doctrine of last clear chance, too,
whereby a negligent person recovers all his damages from a
defendant who was careless towards the negligent plaintiff by
not preventing injury when he has a clear chance to do so.
And this is true, also, where a superseding cause terminates the
liability of a negligent actor completely, and shifts it to a later
tortfeasor. It is a philosophy of "all or nothing." There is no
sharing of burdens although equity has long considered that
equality is equity.
We can hope that the denial of indemnity where the degree
of culpability varies will result in the adoption of the rule of
contribution. The party who exercised the lesser degree of
fault will then, at least, have the satisfaction of not having
to pay all the loss.
CAL LAW 1970
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A recent case that imposes a limitation on the law of indemnity is Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co. 5 Generally
a retailer who becomes strictly liable, being in the chain of
transfers in the sale of a defectively manufactured machine, is
entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer for such payments as the retailer is required to pay to persons injured while
properly using the machine. Here a new Ford automobile
was put on the market with a faulty brake linkage system.
Mrs. Schultz was seriously injured and a judgment for $150,000 was recovered against the manufacturing company and
the dealer. The dealer cross complained for indemnity. The
dealer had worked on the car to put it in condition and had
failed to notice the defect while repairing a brake light switch
located adjacent to the pin that was missing in the brake
assembly. The Court of Appeal held that this failure on the
part of the dealer made it an active tortfeasor and disentitled to
indemnity.
In conclusion, it seems advisable to point out that in all
these indemnity cases there is one unifying principal, whether
the claim is made pursuant to a contract or is based on implication. The one against whom indemnity is sought has been
enriched by the payment. The question simply is whether he
is unjustly enriched. If the thinking of society is that restitution should be made, the party seeking indemnity should win.
Does the contract call for payment? Does the relation of the
parties indicate that plaintiff paid the debt of another? Should
the degree of culpability make a difference? Does the quality
of the act call for repayment? The cases demonstrate judicial thinking on the matter.

VI. Abuse of Process
In Templeton Feed and Grain Co. v. Ralston Purina CO.,6
a clear picture of "abuse of process" was painted by Justice
Tobriner. Both plaintiff and defendant were successful poultry feed vendors who expanded their operations by financing
5. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
279 (1969).
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6. 69 Cal.2d 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344,
446 P.2d 152 (1968).
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food producers such as the Livingstons who were large producers of turkeys on two ranches, the Santa Margarita and
the Arroyo Grande. For several years the Purina Company
had been financing the Livingstons in their Margarita operation in sums in excess of $50,000, all secured by a mortgage
on some 17,000 turkeys together "with replacements, increase,
things confused therewith, and things of the same kind afterwards acquired." These turkeys were said to be located on
the Margarita ranch in Margarita township. This stated location was made pursuant to former Civil Code section 2977,
which was repealed when California enacted the Commercial
Code. The prior statute controlled this case. The turkey
operations were unsuccessful for several years, and the Livingstons were in debt to the Purina Company in an amount in
excess of $50,000.
In 1964, Purina refused to continue the financing operations, so the Livingstons turned to the Templeton Company,
which agreed to finance the raising of turkeys on the Livingston's Arroyo Grande ranch. Purina was informed of the
new arrangement. In fact, representatives of both companies
had agreed upon the arrangements. On this basis, Templeton, in early 1964, delivered 110,000 poults to the Livingstons
on their Arroyo ranch. In midsummer, Purina was casting
longing eyes towards the large number of turkeys the Livingstons had on their Arroyo ranch. Yet they knew that their
mortgage of 1962, covered only turkeys located on the Margarita ranch.
On November 4, just when the market for turkeys was approaching the crucial Thanksgiving period, and there being
turkeys on hand worth over $150,000, Purina filed suit in
claim and delivery for the possession of some 35,000 turkeys
pursuant to sections 509-511 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In order to do this, it had to file an affidavit setting forth
its right to possession. It did so relying on the after-acquired
clause in its 1962 chattel mortgage. Pursuant to this process,
it directed the sheriff to take possession of all the turkeys on
the Arroyo ranch. Templeton, being thereby stymied in its
purposes to sell on a market which would exist only for a
CAL LAW 1970
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limited time, protected itself by paying off Purina's suit against
Livingston in the sum of $53,098, and thus obtained a release
of the claim on its turkeys. These are the facts which were
presented to counsel for Templeton.
The problem involved a matter of restitution; to obtain
the return of the money paid to Purina. Abuse of process
was just one of the remedies available. No doubt, counsel
considered a suit for rescission of the contract made to obtain
the release of the turkeys from the claim of Purina, on the
theory that plaintiff's consent to the agreement was not freely
given,' and also that Purina really gave nothing for the money
paid as there was no right to those turkeys, there being thus
a failure of consideration. s It was a clear case of economic
duress as that term is described in Sistrom v. Anderson,9 and
also of legal compulsion for the protection of its interests as
in Wake Development Co. v. O'Leary.l0 Similar relief would
have been available by a simple suit in quasi-contract, for
money had and received.ll There was really nothing to be
undone, as the release given did not give up anything of
value which would have to be returned. Hence, there was no
basis for going into equity, and a suit for money had and
received, an action at law in form but equitable in substance,
was quite adequate to do justice between the parties.
All these remedies would have allowed the plaintiff to
recover the money paid. However, viewing the facts as indicating elements of intentional, unlawful conduct, bad faith,
and malice, the attorney possibly or probably realized he might
recover exemplary damages. What remedies would enable
counsel to make this claim? Money had and received would
7. Civ. Code §§ 1566, 1567.
8. Civ. Code § 1689.
9. 51 Cal. App.2d 213, 124 P.2d 372
(1942).
10. 118 Cal. App. 131, 4 P.2d 802
(1931). This case is quite similar to
Templeton in that the defendant obtained a lien by levying execution, instead of bringing a claim and delivery
suit, and the execution was preventing
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a sale of property, as in Templeton the
sale of the turkeys was being delayed.
The suit was for legal compulsion, however, instead of abuse of process, but
the facts could have supported abuse of
process.
11. Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
2d 512, 36 P.2d 635, 95 AL.R. 990
(1934).
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not do; nor would economic duress, unless it was extreme;
nor would rescission unless pursuant to three recent cases
which had not been decided while this case was being
planned. 12 [Under those cases, construing the amendments to
the rescission statutes 13 enacted in 1961, it is now possible to
recover both consequential and even punitive damages.] Under the circumstances, the remedy of "abuse of process"
seemed to be the best basis on which to rest a claim for such
damages, if the evidence pointed to the defendant's use of the
claim and delivery process to coerce or extort money payments
or other collateral advantages. Such a use is a perversion of
a process.
Accordingly, counsel brought suit for abuse of process, and
also for money had and received, indicating that restitution
was contemplated. Following the trial, the jury brought in
a verdict for $110,000, thus obviously being impressed with
the bad state of mind of the defendant in view of (a) the limited reach of defendant's mortgage to the Margarita ranch,
(b) the knowledge on the part of the defendant that plaintiff
was financing the operations on the Arroyo ranch, (c) knowledge that its mortgage did not cover the subject turkeys, and
(d) knowledge that plaintiff possessed an interest in the turkeys. From these facts the jury could infer that the process
was used wilfully and for an ulterior purpose. The trial court,
however, had not instructed on the allowance of punitive damages, and with this in mind it granted defendant's motion for a
new trial unless plaintiff agreed to accept only $67,000.
Plaintiff agreed to this condition (that gave it the return of
its money but disallowing other damages). Defendant, however, insisted on appealing the judgment, feeling perhaps that
any claim for punitive damages had been set at rest by the
plaintiff's acceptance of the condition. When defendant continued its appeal, refusing to go along with the trial court's
judgment, plaintiff considered its acceptance as no longer
12. Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors, 270 Cal. App.2d 477. 75 Cal. Rptr.
871 (1969); Millar v. James, 254 Cal.
App.2d 530, 62 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967);
Topanga Corporation v. Gentile, 249
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operative and appealed on the issue of pUllltlve damages,
thus laying the foundation for an instruction on the matter at
the retrial.
The Supreme Court opinion by Justice Tobriner gives us
a complete review of the tort of abuse of process. He reviews
old basic cases14 and quotes Prosser on torts,16 concluding that
there was ample evidence on which the jury could find that
process was used for an improper purpose, in that defendant
knew it was not entitled to possession of the turkeys, and that
their seizure was made to coerce Templeton to discharge the
debt of the Livingstons. The court further held that the
refusal of the defendant to accept the judgment of the trial
court in toto rendered the acceptance of the condition by plaintiff of no effect and, therefore reopened the question of punitive damages. The Court further held that it was error for the
trial court not to have instructed on the issue of punitive damages. Of course, punitive damages are allowed pursuant to
Civil Code section 3294, which requires oppression, fraud,
or malice; malice may be either express, or implied from the
defendant's conduct. In other words, the requisite state of
mind constituting malice may be shown or found objectively. IS
The final disposition of this case following the decision
of the Supreme Court is interesting. It was not retried: plaintiff's counsel advised the author that defendant agreed to a
settlement of $120,000, which exceeds the full verdict of the
jury in the first trial. The case certainly brings forth the responsibility of lawyers in evaluating the pros and cons of a
factual situation, choosing the remedy which will be most
productive for their client, and using discretion in rejecting
the trial court's modification of the jury's verdict.
14. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal.2d
210,317 P.2d 613 (1957); Kyne v. Eustice, 215 Cal. App.2d 627, 30 Cal. Rptr.
391 (1963); Tellefsen v. Key System
Transit Lines, 198 Cal. App.2d 611, 17
Cal. Rptr. 919 (1961).
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667.
16. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal.2d
210, 230, 317 P.2d 613, 625 (1957).
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VII. Conversion
Defining conversion has been said to be difficult, if not impossible; Baron Bramwell said, "I am not very confident as to
what is and what is not a conversion.,,17 More often, we are
told what it is not, rather than what it is. For example, several California cases indicate that "Neither good nor bad
faith, neither care nor negligence, neither knowledge nor ignorance" are the gist of the cause of action.1s Nor is mistake
about some phase of a factual situation of any significance. 19
On the affirmative side, we frequently find that it is a wilful
interference with a chattel without legal justification, depriving one who is entitled to the chattel of the use and possession
of it. 20 Also, it has been said that the wrongful exercise of
dominion over another's personal property is the gist of conversion. 1 Yet it is clear that not every exercise of such dominion is sufficient, unless it is a substantial interference. 2
Section 222a of the Restatement of Torts, points out that an
interference that will amount to a conversion is one that is
so serious that the actor may justly be required to pay the
other the full value of the chattel. The protected interest must
be at least the right to possession and use of the chattel. In
this respect the interest is the same as in a trespass action.
In the recent case of llano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage,3
Itano owned a boat which he kept in moorage at the defendant's wharf. Itano was in arrears in his rental payments and
considerable discussions went on between the parties. Defendant would have liked Itano to move his boat elsewhere, and told him that unless he paid the past due rent the
boat would be moved out of the regular slip to another spot
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17. National Merchants v. Lummey,
44 L.T. 767, 1 Can. L. Rev. p. 145.
18. Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 139
P. 815,51 L.R.A. N.S. 925 (1914); Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App.2d 783, 62
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967).

20. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App.
2d 783, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967).
1. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App.
2d 783,62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967).
2. Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal.2d 541,
176 P.2d 1 (1946).

19. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App.
2d 783, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967); Baer
v. Slater, 261 Mass. 153, 158 N.E. 328,
54 A.L.R. 1328 (1927).

3. 267 Cal. App.2d 84, 72 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1968).
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less desirable but which was locked. Defendant moved the
boat and secured it by a lock and cable across the opening
of the slip. Somehow the boat sank, due to a faulty engine
hose that let water into the boat. Many items such as tools,
kitchen utensils, food, and fishing gear were lost. Hano
brought suit for damages resulting from the moving of the
boat and its sinking. Plaintiff received verdict for $9,150.00,
and defendant appealed from the denial of its motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The reviewing court
reversed and directed the entry of judgment for defendant.
The suit was for damages resulting from conversion or negligence. No attempt was made to recover on the theory of eviction, unlawful detainer, or forcible detainer. Moving the
plaintiff's boat from one place to another did not interfere
with plaintiff's use and possession of his boat. There was no
claim that defendant intended to exercise ownership or made
any use of the boat. The moving of the boat was not a
conversion under Zaslow v. Kroenert 4 nor under Jordan v.
Talbot,5 since both cases require a substantial interference
with plaintiff's possession. Moreover the plaintiff knew that
the boat was likely to be moved, and also the approximate
place to which it was to be moved. The court then examined
the possibility of a cause of action for negligence, and found
no basis for that recovery, even though the original assertion
of a cause of action for negligence was abandoned prior to
trial. As to trespass, there could be no recovery because
there was no showing that the sinking of the boat was caused
by the moving of the boat.
Two cases purport to consider whether the tort of conversion can be applied to mere ideas. Prosser suggests that there
are no good reasons for not extending the tort to ideas,6 but
under today's rules it is required that the ideas should inhere
in some document. Milk, bakery, or newspaper routes are
not subject to conversion. 7 Several cases have involved
the submission of ideas to movie companies for their use. In
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California special provisions are made for the protection of
the products of the mind. s Under Civil Code section 980,
the author or proprietor of any composition in letters or
art has an exclusive ownership " ... in the representation or
expression thereof as against all persons except one who originally and independently creates the same or a similar composition." In Minniear v. Tors et al.,9 it was held such an author
has protect able property. In the absence of such property, one
who submits an idea to one who uses it is entitled to compensation if the circumstances of the disclosure are such that
an agreement to pay may fairly be implied. So a contract,
express or implied, is necessary. And an inference of a promise to pay may result from conduct as well as words. But
in the absence of a statutorily protectable property or a contract, there can be no conversion of an idea.

VIII. Fraud
A. In General
In California, statutes 10 clearly set forth acts constituting
fraud. Fraud may be (a) suggesting a false fact not believed
to be true, (b) asserting a fact not warranted by information
at hand though actually believing the same, (c) suppressing
a true fact known or believed true or (d) promising to do
something without the intention to perform. Inherent in
these provisions is the state of mind necessary to constitute
fraud. l1 The usual requirements are a representation, coupled
with an intent that the representation be relied on by the person entitled to rely and actual reliance. Damage must result
from the reliance.
The remedies for fraud are also detailed by statute. 12 In
general, the person relying is entitled only to his out-of-pocket
8. Civ. Code §§ 980-985.
9. 266 Cal. App.2d 495, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 287 (1968); see also Liability for
the Use of Submitted Ideas, 13 Business
Lawyer p. 90 (1957).
10. See Civ. Code §§ 1572 and 1710.
11. The intent to defraud need not
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A.L.R. 1291 (1941). See also the later
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Cal. App.2d 397, 148 P.2d 901 (1944).

12. See Civ. Code § 3343.
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damage. 13 But fraud may be a basis for the recovery of
punitive damages. 14 Generally, negligence of the victim is no
defense to actionable fraud. 15

B. Opinions by Persons Holding Themselves Out as
Qualified
When is an alleged opinion a statement of fact and therefore an actionable fraud? In Harazim v. George Lynam,16 the
plaintiffs claimed that defendants obtained money from them
by representing that plaintiff's payments were for "interests
in an enterprise established by defendants", when defendants
knew such enterprise was a sham or merely a pretended business. Plaintiffs actually received a fraudulent promissory
note. Defendants referred to "memberships," "contributing
associates," "pure trust indentures" or "certificates" as the
consideration given. They claimed these were not misrepresentations of fact, but were legal opinions made by laymen.
They were merely making plaintiffs "contributing associates."
The Court stated that "misrepresentations of law or legal
opinions expressed by laymen are insufficient" to constitute
fraud, as are opinions as to future profits to be realized. 17 But
the rule is otherwise where the declarant, as here, holds himself
out to be specially qualified, that is, where he assumes to
possess superior knowledge. IS
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13. Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal.
2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948).
14. Civ. Code § 3294.
15. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. 26
Cal.2d 412, 437, 159 P.2d 958, 972
(1945); Seeger v. Odell, 18 Ca1.2d 409,
115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291 (1941);
Oakes v. McCarthy Co., 267 Cal. App.
2d 231, 261, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127, 145
(1968).
16. 267 Cal. App.2d 127, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 670 (1968).
17. 267 Cal. App.2d 127, 131, 72
Cal. Rptr. 670, 672.
18. Haserot v. Keller, 67 Cal. App.
659, 228 P. 383 (1924). This holding is
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supported by § 539 of the Restatement
of Torts, which holds that an opinion is
actionable if it is based on undisclosed
facts as an implied statement that the
maker knows of no facts incompatible
with his opinion. Here defendants actually knew the facts were incompatible
with their stated opinions.
Section 542 of the Restatement states
that persons like these plaintiffs may
rely on opinions of a party contracting
them if he holds himself out as having special knowledge of the matter
which the recipients do not have or,
knows that the recipients will rely on
his opinion.
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C. Holding a Principal for the Fraud of his Agent.
What is necessary to bind a principal for the fraud of his
agent on alleged ostensible authority? In Hartong v. Partake
Inc./ 9 the Partake Company had area directors who had specific duties entitling them to hire assistants and to receive advertising materials for Partake. One such director, Werry,
went beyond his authority by organizing businesses of his own
along Partake lines, and telling his customers he was the west
coast branch of Partake. In doing so, Werry associated himself with one Raub and introduced him to Mr. Melvin, Vice
President of Partake. Werry and Raub, operating as their
own "Western Way Company," made franchise contracts with
plaintiffs, representing that they had the backing of the large
and financially stable Partake.
Plaintiffs lost considerable money when their franchises
failed. They recovered judgments against Werry and Partake,
which were affirmed on appeal.
The Court laid down the following basic principles as a
basis for holding a principal liable on the ostensible authority
of his agent:
1. The agency cannot be established by the representations or conduct of the purported agent alone.
2. Liability is always based on an estoppel.
3. There must be representations by the principal.
4. These representations must lead to a reasonable belief
of the party dealing with the agent that the agent
has authority to represent the principal.
5. The relying party must not be guilty of negligence.
Here, the belief in the existence of the authority of the agent
was based on the following facts and conduct by the defendants:
1. Werry's duty as area director included the creation of

such new businesses as the Western Way Company.
19. 266 Cal. App.2d 942, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1968); see also Meyer v.
Ford Motor Co., 275 Cal. App.2d - ,
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2. Werry had authority to hire Raub, and Partake knew
about Raub's being hired.
3. Both Werry and Raub made extensive use of Partake's
facilities.
4. Partake knew of the use of Partake advertising, office,
and program.
5. Plaintiffs signed their contracts after Mr. Melvin of
Partake had visited the office and was presumed to
have seen what was going on.
D. Duty to Speak Out as a Fiduciary
When is there a duty to speak? In Black et al v. Shearson,
Hammill and Co.,a° Dunbar was a partner in defendant's brokerage firm, and was also a director in a private corporation
whose stock the brokerage firm was selling to its customers,
including plaintiffs. A campaign was developed to finance the
private corporation with "plans that represented the corporation in glowing terms." Plaintiffs paid $20,000 for $2000
face value stock in the corporation-while the brokerage firm
knew, through the knowledge of Dunbar, that the corporation
was in serious financial straits. Of course, as a fiduciary, it
was under an obligation to speak.
Dunbar claimed, however, that as he was a fiduciary of the
corporation, as a director, he could not divulge his information
to the plaintiffs. The Court properly ruled against him and
affirmed a verdict for $20,000 in compensatory damages and
$5000 in punitive damages. The Court concluded that knowledge of the falsity of the statements, or scienter, is an essential
element of fraud, and that there was substantial evidence
of the elements of fraud present,l In fact, the partners made
the sales by explaining that Dunbar was an insider, and they
were therefore in a position to know the facts, indicating
that the element of malice was in evidence.
The big fact here was the fiduciary relation. This relationship imposed a duty to make full disclosure, and it was no
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20. 266 Cal. App.2d 362, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 157 (1968).
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1. Krause v. Apodaca, 186 Cal. App.
2d 413, 9 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1960).
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excuse that Dunbar was under two inconsistent fiduciary relationships. No one can put himself in a position to serve two
masters, and then use his dual position to the damage of one
of his cestuis que trustent.

E. Damages
In Holder v. Home Savings and Loan Assn.,2 it is indicated
that if a buyer of land is induced to purchase through the fraud
of the vendor, and the vendee later defaults on his contract,
such default alone will not defeat the claim of the vendee for
damages occasioned by the fraud. This is true even after
the vendor has foreclosed trust deeds following the purchaser's
default. 3 We have noted that both compensatory and punitive damages are available in fraud cases.
In Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors of Santa Ana,4 the
Court allowed both consequential and punitive damages in a
rescission suit. For many years in fraud cases, damages were
not allowed where the defrauded person sought rescission.
The remedies were felt to be inconsistent. A suit for damages
affirmed the contract, but a suit for rescission disaffirmed it.
With the amendment of the rescission statute in 1961, this distinction was abandoned. 6 In Horn, three types of recovery
were allowed in the fraudulent sale of the Chevrolet car: restitutional payments of $842.72, disbursements of $500, and
exemplary damages of $5000. This decision has eased the
expansion of remedies and thereby removed many pitfalls
for the practitioner.
In Oakes v. McCarthy Co. et el,6 the Oakes were the purchasers of a home in the Palos Verdes area of Los Angeles.
The McCarthy Company had purchased the area, subdivided
2. 267 Cal. App.2d 91, 72 Cal. Rptr.
704 (1968).
3. Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal.2d 178,
346 P.2d 758 (1959). This is an important case, as the cause of action for
fraud survived the procedure of foreclosure by the vendor.
4. 270 Cal. App.2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr.
871 (1969). For further discussion of
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this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this
volume.
5. Civ. Code § 1692, added Stats.
1961, Ch. 589, § 3, p. 1734. The recovery of punitive damages was foreshadowed in Millar v. James, 254 Cal.
App.2d 530, 62 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967).
6. 267 Cal. App.2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr.
127 (1968).
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it, and constructed home sites and homes thereon. In the
course of the development, other companies did work on the
lots; the Thompson Corporation did the cutting, filling, and
grading according to plans submitted by an engineering service
company. This was to be done in the presence of an inspector supplied by the Warren Company. The Warren Company
was to supervise the work done by Thompson. The inspector
was discharged because he did not make the required compaction tests. But Warren made the tests and issued its reports to
McCarthy, the FHA, the County of Los Angeles and McCarthy's architect.
September 7, 1956, the Oakes moved into their home.
They were given a certificate guaranteeing workmanship and
materials. It said the house was constructed under the Los
Angeles Building Code, and that the county FHA inspectors
had inspected the grounds and "these inspections are your
assurance that this building has been properly constructed. m
Plaintiff was never told his house was on fill and salesmen
were told not to say anything about the fill unless specifically
asked about it. By 1958, the house had moved with the downward slide of the fill and the house was seriously damaged.
The house would have to be removed and rebuilt.
The jury returned verdicts against both the Warren Company and McCarthy for $14,825 as compensatory damages,
and against McCarthy Company for $77,500 punitive damages.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that Warren owed
a duty of care to plaintiffs although there was no privity
between them.s When Warren undertook to supervise and
inspect the cutting, filling, and grading, it assumed a duty
toward plaintiffs to exercise due care. If it had given only
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7. 267 Cal. App.2d 231, 245, 73
Cal. Rptr. 127, 135.
8. The court relied upon Biakanja v.
Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, 65
A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958). This case can
well be compared to Connor v. Great
Western Savings and Loan Assn., 69
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Cal.2d 850, 23 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d
609 (1968), holding a lender of money
for the financing of land development
liable to a purchaser of a defective
home on the land developed, even
though there was no privity.
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professional advice to McCarthy, then it would not be liable
to plaintiffs. The jury evidently found that Warren was supervising and inspecting, and therefore held it liable.
The liability of McCarthy, on the other hand, was for fraud.
There was no disclosure (a) that the house was on filled land
or (b) the drainage was towards the rear without proper outlets. There were positive assertions that the premises were
constructed (a) in good workmanlike manner and (b) in compliance with FHA inspection regulations, such inspections being plaintiffs' assurance of proper grading. The intent to conceal the fill could be inferred from the instructions to salesmen
not to mention this fact unless asked about it. Even negligence on the plaintiffs' part would not have been a defense. 9
Hence all the punitive damages of $77,500 were recoverable from McCarthy, whose net worth was shown to be in
excess of $2,000,000. Such net worth evidence is always probative evidence in the assessment of punitive damages.
This case rounds out the protective duties owing to purchasers of tract homes in projects where there is massive building: (a) institutions financing the project are liable to homeowners who suffer losses from defective plans or construction,
and there is a duty of ordinary care towards the then unknown
owner; (b) there is a similar duty to exercise ordinary care on
the part of those who supervise the cutting, filling, and grading
of sites; (c) the promoters are held liable for misrepresentations as to the nature of the soundness of the site and the
construction of the building itself, and this includes the failure to reveal latent conditions. Such suggestions, assertions,
and suppressions constitute fraud under Civil Code sections
1572 and 1710, and justify the recovery of punitive damages
under Civil Code section 3294. These damages can be quite
high if defendants happen to have substantial net worths.

IX. Interference with Contractual Rights
This tort, while relatively new, is important; it is related to
other areas of the law such as labor, equity, and restitution,
9. Seeger v. Odell, 18 Ca1.2d 409,
115 P.2d 977,136 A.L.R. 1291 (1941).
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as well as contract law. In fact, much labor law, before the
advent of the federal acts relating thereto, was in the tort field.
As a result of the federal acts, we now talk about "unfair labor
practices" instead of tortious acts, but the subject is still important. Prosser devotes twenty-five pages of his text and
some twenty pages of his casebook to it. Yet it is seldom
covered in a course on torts. The material is at the end of the
book, and we rarely get to it. Bar examinations usually avoid
the subject. However, general principles of tort law are applicable.
A tort involves an act or conduct by a person which damages a legally protected interest of another. The state of
mind of the actor is often quite important. The tort of contractual interference usually requires a bad state of mind. The
conduct must be done knowingly or intentionally. If the conduct is carried out without knowledge of the existing contractual relationship, there is no actionable wrong. Yet the damages may be just as serious.
Since Lumley v Gye/o it has been a tort for a person to
knowingly induce a third person to breach a valid and existing
contract. In such cases, the guilty party usually profits from
the breach and his own wrongful conduct. The wronged person may sue in tort for damages, in assumpsit or in quasicontract for the benefits realized. If no benefit is realized, the
remedy is limited to the tort action.
The case which prompts us to mention this tort is Friedman
v. Jackson,ll which is particularly interesting since it involved
a contract that was not enforceable; the contract was not in
writing as required by the statute of frauds. 12 Plaintiff was a
real estate dealer or broker. Owners of real estate entered
into an oral contract with plaintiff whereby plaintiff agreed to
find a purchaser for the property, and it was agreed that a
commission of 5 % of the purchase price would be paid to
plaintiff for his services. Plaintiff showed the property to fourteen prospective buyers, the defendant being one. Defend-
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10. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
11. 266 Cal. App.2d 517, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1968).
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ant then informed plaintiff that the price was too high and that
he was no longer interested. But defendant then told the
owners that he had heard of their property being for sale from
a friend, not from plaintiff, and proceeded to buy the property.
The plaintiff sued defendant for the real estate commission
on the basis of the wrongful interference with the unenforceable contract. Could defendant take advantage of this statute
by stepping into the shoes of the seller, who would have had a
good defense if he had refused to pay the commission? The
trial court decided that the defense was available. The trial
court presumably decided in defendant's favor in reliance on
two cases that merely hold that a broker cannot recover his
commission from a seller or owner who knowingly sells property notwithstanding his contract with the broker.
There is a strong policy behind the statute of frauds and, if
the broker's contract is not in writing, he cannot recover either
on the oral contract or in quasi-contract for the benefit conferred. 13 He may conceivably recover on the basis of an
estoppel, but such an estoppel is difficult to establish. 14 But a
case against a third party wrongdoer, such as defendant, is an
entirely different matter. There is no policy reason to protect him, he being an intentional wrongdoer acting with full
knowledge of the interest of the broker.
The important fact or question here is whether plaintiff
broker has such an interest in an unenforceable contract that
it is protected against invasions by third persons having knowledge thereof. The Supreme Court of California, at a rather
early date, spoke quite strongly about the valuable nature of
the interests of parties to unenforceable contracts: 15
Although the statute declares a parol contract for the
sale of land void, it does not make it illegal. It is not
a corrupt or wicked agreement; nor does it violate any
principle of public policy. Parties are at liberty to act
under such contracts if they think proper. Many such
13. Colburn v. Sessin et aI., 94 Cal.
App.2d 4, 209 P.2d 989 (1949); Sweeley
v. Gordon, 47 Cal. App.2d 381, 118 P.
2d 14 (1941).
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have been carried into complete effect by payment of the
price and the conveyance of the land. 16
This favorable attitude is further evidenced by the fact that
if a vendee makes a down payment on such an unenforceable
contract, and then decides that he does not desire to go
through with it, he cannot recover his down payment so long
as the seller is willing to perform.17 So long as the seller does
not repudiate, equity will not require restitution of the down
payment. Moreover, it is hornbook law that a purchaser of
real estate who has performed an oral contract in improving
the property and making substantial payments is entitled to
specific performance from the vendor. ls Even if the promise
is to leave property by will to someone who is to render services to a particular member of the family, the court will often
compel the promisor, his representatives or other heirs, to
convey the property to the promisee who has rendered long
and faithful service in reliance on the oral promise. A new
will cannot be written, but a constructive trust can be dec1ared. 19
Thus there is a real legal basis for finding that a person
who has entered into an unenforceable contract has a valuable
right that must be respected and protected against intentional
and unprivileged interferences. The court in Friedman quotes
from the 1963 New Jersey case of Harris v. Perea
One who unjustifiably interferes with the contract of
another is guilty of a wrong. And since men usually
16. 121 Cal. 42, 45, 53 P. 642, 643.
17. Noel v. Dumont Builders, Inc.,
178 Cal. App.2d 691, 3 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1960); Maddox v. Rainoldi, 163 Cal.
App.2d 384, 329 P.2d 599 (1958); Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 66 P.
471, 86 A.S. 283 (1901).
18. Engasser v. Jones, 88 Cal. App.
2d 171, 198 P.2d 546 (1948).
19. Justice Traynor explained why
this is done in Monarco v. Lo Greco,
35 Cal.2d 621, 626, 220 P.2d 737, 741
(1950):
"In reality it is not the representa356
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tion that the contract will be put in
writing or that the statute will not be
invoked, but the promise that the contract will be performed that a party relies upon when he changes his position
because of it. Moreover, a party who
has accepted the benefits of an oral
contract will be unjustly enriched if
the contract is not enforced whether his
representations related to the requirements of the statute or were limited to
affirmations that the contract would be
performed."
20. 41 N.J. 455,197 A.2d 359 (1964).
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honor their promises no matter what flaws a lawyer can
find, the offender should not be heard to say the contract he meddled with could not have been enforced. l
And as stated in Zimmerman v. Bank of America: 2
The nature of the tort does not vary with the legal
strength, or enforceability, of the relation disrupted. The
actionable wrong lies in the inducement to break the
contract or to sever the relationship, not in the kind of
contract or relationship so disrupted, whether it is written or oral, enforceable or not enforceable. 3
Justice Herndon goes on to state: ". . . a purchaser may
not by fraudulent means, cause a seller unwittingly to so
change his position that thereafter he cannot reasonably be
required to fulfill his commitment to his agent."4
The Court then pointed out that the California decisions
referred to are in accord with the provisions of the Restatement of Torts on the matter. An analysis of section 766 of
the Restatement is effectively done. Section 7 66 provides:
One who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform
a contract with another or (b) enter into or continue a
business relation with another is liable to the other for
the harm caused thereby.
The greater definiteness of the right under clause (a) than the
right under clause (b) indicates that there would be a greater
privilege to induce a party not to enter into the relationship
than to induce a breach of a definite contractual relationship,
as was the situation in Friedman.
X. Governmental Accountability

Accountability, of course, is the opposite of immunity.
Immunity gives one a valuable position; it is one of the four
1. 41 N.J. 455, 197 A.2d 359, 363.
2. 191 Cal. App.2d 55, 12 Cal. Rptr.
319 (1961).
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fundamental legal relationships.5 It is a comforting position
to be in, knowing that no one has the power or right to bring
a suit for damages against the immune person. Very often,
persons who have caused someone damage watch the passing
of the statute of limitations with a feeling of great relief; such
a person has suddenly become immune. Fortunately, injured
persons can feel a sense of relief from the fact that immunities
are on the way out. Charitable institutions, formerly immune
from liability, are now losing this desired and valued status. 6
Likewise, interspousal immunity is on the way out; in California it is gone both in intentional' and negligent wrongdoingS
by one spouse against the other. Where children are involved,
that too is being changed, especially where the parent is insured. 9
Immunity of governments has been the rule dating back to
kingship days when people were "subjects" of kings. The
word "subject" in this sense is foreign to our understanding.
And this is probably why Chief Justice Traynor said in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District: 1o
How [this rule of sovereign immunity] became in the
United States the basis for a rule that the federal and state
governments did not have to answer for their torts has
been called 'one of the mysteries of legal evolution.'ll
5. Professor Hohfeld of Yale named
these four as right. privilege, power, and
immunity. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale Law Journal pp.
16-59 (1913-14).
6. Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen
27 Cal.2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946);
Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Salvation
Army, 83 Cal. App. 455, 256 P. 1106
(1927).
7. Self v. Self, 58 Cal.2d 683, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962).
8. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 26
Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962).
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9. See 19 Hastings L.J. 201 (196768); see also 1963 A.S. 376.
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10. 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
359 P.2d 457 (1961) modified in 57 Cal.
2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d
325.
11. 55 Cal.2d 211, 214, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 90, 359 P.2d 457, 459; modified in
57 Cal.2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370
P.2d 325. For an historical perspective, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall.
419, 1 L. Ed. 440, 2 S.Ot. 419 (1792).
It was decided that a citizen could sue a
state in the federal courts. Only Justice
Iredell dissented, arguing that the principle of immunity is fundamental. Significantly, the Court was' immediately
overruled by the first "post adoption
of the Constitution" amendment, the
eleventh. It provided that the judicial
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Immunity being the rule and liability the exception, citizens
injured by the tortious conduct of governmental employees acting in the course and scope of their employment were left to
seek their redress in the mercy of the legislature by submission
of a private bill for compensation. Legislative and judicial
exceptions to this cumbersome and uncertain remedy became
more numerous, as legislatures found that the growth of governmental activity was occasioning a proportionate increase
in the volume of private bills seeking compensation for governmental wrongs. Early judicial exceptions predicated liability
on an often tenuous and illusory distinction in the nature of the
activity, liability being imposed when the sovereign acted in a
proprietary capacity and denied when functioning in a governmental activity. Legislative modifications to the doctrine
were often narrow and limited in the kinds of public entities
within the statutory purview, resulting in illogical and serious
inequalities; recovery often depended upon which particular
governmental agency committed the wrong. 12
The adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act 13 in 1946,
creating tort liability of the federal government for losses and
injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment, was
a great step forward, setting the direction for other jurisdictions to follow. Immunity was retained for official acts involving discretion (acts involving the exercise of jUdgment)
and also for torts involving a specific intent or high degree
of CUlpability. Much of the litigation under the Act concerned
the meaning of the "discretion" conduct clause. Dalehite v.
power of the United States should not
be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by one
of the citizens of another state or by
citizens or subjects of a foreign state.
Thus, it became federal policy that an
individual cannot sue a state without
its consent, either in its own or in federal courts. See Borchard, Government
Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. p. 6.
12. For extensive historical backCAL LAW 1970
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ground of both national and state immunity see: Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers, 77 Harv. L. Rev., p.
1 (1963-64); Borchard, Government
Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J., p. 1;
VanAlstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Law Making in a Statutory Milieu, 15 Stan. L. Rev., p. 163
(1962-63); Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 359 P.2d 457.
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq.
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United StatesI4 set the pattern. Where there is room for policy

judgment and decision, there is discretion. So acts of subordinates carrying out such policies according to plan are not actionable.
Early cases in California followed the rule of immunity, basing the immunity on a lack of consent to be sued. 15 A statute
enacted in 1893, providing that those having claims for negligence against the state were authorized". . . to bring suit
thereon . . ." was subsequently held not to be a waiver of
sovereign immunity but a mere grant of a procedural right. 16
Other bases for preserving immunity and rejecting liability
were: lack of consent to substantive liability,I7 lack of power
to respond in damages/ 8 and inapplicability of the doctrine of
respondeat superior to municipal officers charged with a duty
prescribed and limited by law. 19 Early exceptions to the rule
of sovereign immunity were found in the constitutional requirement to pay just compensation for private property taken
for public use,20 liability for obligations assumed under a contract,1 and what became known as the "nuisance exception."2
Muskopf3 and Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District4
discarded the rule and pressured the adoption of the state Tort
Claims Act in 1963.
With enactment of the California Tort Claims Act, ".
all common law or judicially declared forms of liability, except
for such liability as may be required by state or federal constitution . . ."5 were abolished. Government Code section
14. 346 U.S. 15, 97 L.Ed. 1427, 73
S.Ct. 956 (1953).
15. Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 P.
951, 27 AS. 203, 15 L.R.A 431 (1892).
16. Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316,
55 P. 1000 (1899).
17. Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 53
P. 416 (1898).
18. Hensley v. Reclamation Dist. No.
556, 121 Cal. 96, 53 P. 401 (1898).
19. Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782,
127 P. 50 (1912).
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20. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. City of
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Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L.Ed. 979,
17 S.Ct. 581 (1897).
1. Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690,
38 P. 457, 43 AS. 158 (1894).
2. Conniff v. City and County of
San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45, 7 P. 41
(1885).
3. 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
359 P.2d 457 (1961) modified in 57 Cal.
2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d
325.
4. 55 Cal.2d 224, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97,
359 P.2d 465 (1961).
5. Gov. Code, § 815. See LegislaCAL LAW 1970
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815 limits liability to the extent provided by statute. Section
815 (b) provides that the only immunities are those provided
by statute. Under the same section, the liability of a public
entity is subject to any defenses that would be available if it
were a private person. Section 815.2 ( a) makes the state
agency liable for injuries caused by an employee in the course
of his employment if the employee is liable apart from this section, while part (b) of the same section provides that the
agency is not liable if the employee or official is immune.
Thus the immunity of the state agency and the official are coextensive. The general rule is that liability exists, while immunity rests on exceptions. This reverses the old attitude
toward governmental accountability.
Thus to get immunity we must look to the statutory exceptions. To begin with, we find that a state agency cannot be liable for punitive damages awarded under section 3294 of the
Civil Code. 6 Government Code sections 818.2, 818.6, and
818.8, are specific exceptions to liability for acts such as those
that indicate a high degree of culpability or intentional wrongdoing. Government Code section 820.2 sets forth the exception for acts involving discretion, much as set forth in the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the exception covers such acts
whether or not the discretion is abused. How are discretionary acts to be separated from so-called ministerial ones?
In Johnson v. State,7 William Bear, as placement officer of
the State Youth Authority, had a young parolee, sixteen years
of age, whom he wished to place in a foster home. The J ohnsons had expressed a desire to give a poor boy a home and
Bear arranged to place young Chemlouski with them. He
had homicidal tendencies and had a background of violence
and cruelty towards animals and humans.
A few days after he arrived in the Johnson home, he assaulted Mrs. Johnson with a butcher knife. Bear never
warned the Johnsons about the known tendencies of the youth.
tive Committee Comment-Senate, p.
119.
6. Gov. Code § 818.
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Suit was brought against the state; the state filed a motion for
summary judgment and it was granted, on the state's argument
that the parole officer was immune while exercising discretion
and so the state was immune. The state, trying to bring itself
within the misrepresentation exception, also argued that Bear
had told the Johnsons that there was nothing in Chemlouski's
background indicative of violent or criminal tendencies, and
as such he had misrepresented the facts to them. Government
Code section 818.8, grants immunity to the public entity where
injury is caused by a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional.
This is one of the few exceptions to the general principle of
respondeat superior, which prevails throughout the act. A
question of immunity is also raised by section 845.8, which
precludes liability from attaching to either the public entity
or the employee in determining whether to parole or release a
prisoner.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment.
Justice Tobriner, speaking for the Supreme Court regretted to
some extent that the act makes the immunity of the agency
coextensive with that of the employee, for that compels the
Court to proceed with a determination, or an interpretation
of the statutory language. He indicated that the problem
would have been simpler if it were recognized that there may
be different reasons for granting immunity to the agency than
for doing so for the employee. In dealing with the grant of
immunity under section 845.8, Justice Tobriner viewed this
immunity as terminating with the decision to parole or release. Negligence occurring after the decision to parole is
subject to redress unless there is immunity under some other
section. He also refused to consider granting immunity on the
basis that a misrepresentation was made pursuant to section
818.8. The same word appears in the federal Act, and in
United States v. Neustadt,S misrepresentation was limited to
its general meaning in the law of deceit, which refers to finan8. 366 u.s. 696, 6 L.Ed.2d 614, 81
S.Ct. 1294 (1961); F.R.A. misrepresented the property value on which Neu-
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cial losses rather than personal injuries. The failure to give
warning to the J ohnsons cannot be referred to as a misrepresentation. The Court stated that there was a duty to reveal the
fact of the boy's criminal record, if known. So the question
narrowed itself to whether the revealing of facts, if known, is
a matter of discretion. If it is a matter of discretion, the immunity is given whether or not discretion was abused. 9
The choice was whether to use dictionary definitions of the
word "discretionary" or to consider policy considerations.
When should there be a blanket rule not to entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision? The Court recognized that line-drawing difficulties would arise constantly, but decided that there is no
plausible reason for allowing immunity here. In thinking
about statutory interpretation, this writer likes to return to the
language of Judge Learned Hand:
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their
literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most
reliable source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it statute, a contract, or anything else. But it
is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of a dictionary;
but to remember that statutes always have some purpose
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 10
The Court here reviewed the dictionary approach and then refused to enmesh itself in such a semantic thicket, and instead
pursued the quest for the legislative intent and purpose. It
had its own decision in Ham v. County of Los Angeles,ll pointing to the impossibility of doing anything without some discretion being involved, ". . . even if it is only the driving of a
nail." Nearly everything involves ministerial as well as discretionary elements. A line must be drawn somewhere. Certainly the case stands for a separation between making a deci9. Gov. Code § 820.2.
10. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d
737, 739 (1945) cert. granted 325 U.S.
847, 89 L.Ed. 1969, 65 S.Ct. 1409 affd.
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sion and carrying it out. The exception for immunity terminates when the decision is made, and the liability in tort takes
over in the performance of the task.
The thinking in the case of Johnson v. State/ 2 is affirmed
in the case of McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles. 13 Here a
police officer answered a call about a collision at an intersection within the city limits. While investigating the accident,
he carelessly directed the plaintiff, who had been slightly injured in the collision, to go into the traffic and show him just
where the impact had taken place. No flares were set out, as
generally required in such situations at night. Another driver
did not see the officer and plantiff standing together and struck
plaintiff, causing him serious injury. The Supreme Court
by Justice Tobriner, again, held for the plaintiff, affirming the
decision of the lower court. The city relied on section 820.2
of the Government Code, and as in Johnson claimed that what
the officer did involved discretionary elements. The Court
reviewed the dictionary semantic approach and then concluded
that classifying the act of a public employee as discretionary
will not produce immunity under section 820.2, if the injury
to another results, not from the discretion in undertaking the
act, but from the employee's negligence in performing it, citing
Johnson v. State 14 and Sava v. Fuller. 15 The Court added further that in this instance discretion was not causal; it was negligence in carrying out the assignment that was causal. Thus,
the separation of negligence in performance from the discretionary assignment is now firmly rooted in our jurisprudence.
These cases show the trend; immunity is limited by statutory
interpretation.
The riots in the Watts area of Los Angeles in 1965, caused
severe losses to many property owners in the area. Assembled
crowds destroyed valuable properties and businesses. Police
and governmental agencies did nothing to prevent the destructions and losses. A number of those sustaining losses claimed
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12. 69
447 P.2d
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449 P.2d
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14. 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
447 P.2d 352 (1968).
15. 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 312 (1967).
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damages from city authorities and officers who had failed
to take any steps to stop the riots. In Susman v. City of Los
Angeles/6 eleven causes of action were stated against the city.
The action sought to charge the City of Los Angeles and the
State of California, by and through their employees, with negligently and carelessly causing and aggravating the rioting,
thereby causing the losses. All the causes were stated in similar language. The trial court sustained demurrers to all these
causes; plaintiffs appealed therefrom.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decisions. These claims
were based entirely on the alleged inaction of the city's officers.
The Court pointed out that the liability of governmental agencies is now governed by the State Tort Liability Act. 17 Section
818.2 of the Government Code provides that: "A public entity
is not liable for an injury caused by adopting or failing to
adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law." Likewise, section 845, provides that: "Neither a public entity nor
a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if
police protection service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police protection service." The Law Revision Commission has stated that: "Whether such police protection should
be provided at all, and the extent to which it should be
provided, are political decisions which are committed to
policy-making officials of government."lS Courts cannot assume the making of such decisions. Certainly those decisions
involve the exercise of discretion, which is definitely within the
range of immunity under section 820.2.
This decision is certainly to be contrasted with the Johnson
case. Perhaps if police officers had attempted to act after a
decision to act had been made, their methods of carrying out
the policy decided on might have been said to be ministerial
and have required them to be performed with due care. It
seems pertinent to inquire whether governmental agents can
16. 269 Cal. App.2d 803, 75 CaL
Rptr. 240 (1969).
17. Gov. Code §§ 810 et seq
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always protect themselves by remaining inactive and doing
nothing.
In Flournoy v. State of California,19 the state was charged
with maintaining a long bridge in a negligent and dangerous
condition, in that it became covered with ice and no warning
notice was posted. This bridge, 565 feet long, is on highway
89 in Shasta County. The southbound approach, on which
decedent was traveling, is three miles long, level, and well
paved. There was ice only on the bridge, formed by mist from
the flowing stream. Decedent was followed by a truck. Decedent's car slid out of control on the ice; the truck did likewise and crashed into decedent's car. As indicated above,
the Government Code now sets the guidelines for the government's liabilities and immunities. Section 835 makes the
state liable for a dangerous condition of public property.
Liability may attach where the government created the
dangerous condition, or where it had notice of the condition
and failed to take protective measures to warn travelers.
There are again statutory exceptions. There is immunity
where (a) there is a failure to put up traffic signals prescribed
by the Vehicle Code,20 (b) for injuries caused by the approved
plans or designs of public works,l (c) for accidents caused by
reasonably apparent weather conditions2and (d) for accidents
due to reasonable government acts.3
Basic here is whether the formation of ice on the bridge was
part of its design; was this an ice-prone bridge for which the
state would be liable? Also, there could be liability because
of the state's knowledge of the condition, which a reasonably
careful driver would not recognize and of which the state
failed to warn. The first theory involves the creation of a
dangerous condition, and the second passive negligence in
failing to warn. The state, of course, set up all arguments
pointing to immunity. The trial court entered summary judgment for defendant, which the Court of Appeal reversed on
19. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
485 (1969).
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the theories indicated. The trial and future appeals may make
more clear the principles determining the liability and immunity of the state for dangerous conditions of public property.
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